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Abstract 
The present study was designed to address whether recalling specific autobiographical 
memories is more difficult when they are self-relevant compared to non-relevant. In recent 
years, a number of experimental studies have indicated that self-relevant memories are more 
likely to be recalled without a specific time frame or very much detail. Unfortunately, these 
findings have not been integrated into the popular executive resources theory of 
autobiographical memory recall or theories of independent semantic and episodic memory 
stores. This study tested the hypothesis that self-relevant memories will be accessed in the 
semantic store and therefore will require more executive resources to generate a final specific 
memory. Contrary to predictions, results demonstrated that participants with low pre-existing 
executive resources used more executive resources when recalling non-relevant memories 
compared to self-relevant memories. The unexpected pattern of results suggest that either self-
relevance acted much like the self-reference effect and made recall easier or that the 
instructions in the non-relevant condition may have been differentially difficult. 
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Introduction 
 When asked to recall an example of their “outgoing” behavior, self-proclaimed 
extroverts will likely recall a category of events. They may tell you that they were involved in 
the student government, implying that they have outgoing qualities. However, they may have 
difficulty recalling a specific instance of outgoing behavior (Brunot & Sanitioso, 2004). In 
fact, research has shown that people spontaneously recall general trait self-knowledge, rather 
than specific memories, when searching for a self-relevant memory (Klein, Sherman, & 
Loftus, 1996).  
In recent years, a number of experimental studies have indicated that self-relevant 
memories are more likely to be recalled without a specific time frame or very much detail. 
There has been a brief flourish of research in that participants with depression  recall less 
specific memories in response to cues relating to self-relevant, depressive themes, or 
depressive schemas (Barnhofer, Crane, Spinhoven, & Williams, 2007; Crane, Barnhofer, & 
Williams, 2007; Spinhoven, Bockting, Kremers, Schene, & Williams, 2007). Similarly, social 
psychologists have shown experimentally a relationship between the self-relevance of 
autobiographical recall and the specificity of the recalled memory (Brunot & Sanitioso, 2004). 
Unfortunately, this emerging pattern in autobiographical memory research has not been 
integrated into the larger body of literature. 
Two theoretical approaches could potentially explain these findings and establish a 
framework to study self-relevant autobiographical memories in the future. First, there is a 
strong body of literature demonstrating that autobiographical memory is recalled in a 
hierarchical fashion, which requires cognitive resources to proceed to the desired level of the 
hierarchy (Conway & Pleydell-Pierce, 2000; Dalgleish et al., 2007; Haque & Conway, 2001; 
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Willaims, 2006). Second, there is an extensive body of literature that has demonstrated a clear 
distinction between semantic and episodic self-knowledge (Klein & Sherman, 1997; Klein et 
al., 1996). The factual based self-knowledge (semantic memory) and the event based self-
knowledge (episodic memory) are stored independently of each other. Additionally, the 
degree of self-relevance often determines whether a memory is retrieved from the semantic or 
episodic storage (Klein, Babey, & Sherman, 1997; Klein, Robertson, Gangi, & Loftus, 2008). 
Therefore, I believe the hierarchical nature of autobiographical memory recall, combined with 
the distinct semantic and episodic memory stores, can account for the lack of specificity found 
in self-relevant autobiographical memories.  
 When progressing through a hierarchical retrieval process for a specific 
autobiographical memory, executive resources are consumed (Dalgleish et al., 2007). 
Executive resources are cognitive resources that are utilized for the control of attention and 
working memory (Banich, 2009). While the measurement of executive resources can be 
somewhat vague, it is a well validated construct that has been studied extensively in cognitive 
psychology as well as in cognitive neuroscience (Banich, 2009). Researchers have also shown 
that the specificity of autobiographical recall is predicted by reduced executive resources 
(Dalgleish et al., 2007, Neshat-Doost, Dalgleish, & Golden, 2008).  Although executive 
resources can account for most instances of reduced specificity in autobiographical memory, 
its relationship with the self-relevance of those memories is unclear. Given the extensive role 
of executive resources in everyday cognitive functioning and its relationship with 
autobiographical memory recall, it is important to integrate research on self-relevance of 
autobiographical memories into this literature. 
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 In order to understand how executive resources are utilized in the hierarchical search 
for a specific self-relevant memory, we must understand where the initial memory search 
begins from. Self-relevant self-knowledge is typically retrieved from a semantic store of 
memory (Klein et al., 1996). Therefore, the prepotent response when recalling a self-relevant 
memory is characterized by the broader, factual nature of semantic memory. According to a 
hierarchical theory of autobiographical memory recall, a memory search starting from this 
broader storage should require more effort to continue the hierarchical memory search to find 
a specific episodic memory (Haque & Conway, 2001). Alternately, less-relevant memories 
tend to originate from the episodic memory store and contain a greater degree of detail. These 
less-relevant memories should already be sufficiently specific and therefore require less effort 
in the search process. 
 The following dissertation will first give a description of autobiographical memory 
specificity and how it has been explained in the executive resource framework. Second, I will 
briefly discuss of the two distinct memory stores and their relation to the self-relevance of a 
memory search. Third, I will explain the small number of studies that have found that self-
relevant memories are recalled as less specific. Fourth, I will discuss my hypothesized main 
effects and interaction. Fifth, I will discuss the methodology I used to test the hypothesis that 
self-relevant recall requires a relatively large amount of executive resources. Sixth, I will 
explain the analyses and results, as well as, a series of post hoc analyses. And finally, I will 
discuss the unexpected pattern of findings and their implications. 
Executive Resources and Autobiographical Specificity 
 Executive resources are used for effortful control of mental tasks and once depleted 
will often result in failure to complete a complex cognitive task (Banich, 2009). Executive 
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resources are used for any number of everyday cognitive tasks, including recalling specific 
autobiographical memories (Dalgleish et al., 2007). Recalling specific autobographical 
memories can be a difficult cognitive task, consuming cognitive resources to move down a 
hierarchy from general lifetime periods to specific event memories (Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000). A standardized measure of autobiographical memory specificity was 
developed to test for problems in generating specific memories among depressives (Williams 
& Broadbent, 1986). People who have difficulty recalling specific memories on this test have 
been shown to have significantly worse clinical outcomes (Brittlebank, Scott, & Williams, 
1993; Gibbs & Rude, 2004; Mackinger, Loschin, & Leibetseder, 2000; Peeters, Wessel, 
Merckelbach, & Boon-Vermeeren, 2002; van Minnen, Wessel, Verhaak, & Smeenk, 2005). A 
broad range of explanations for this overgeneral pattern of autobiographical memory have 
been proposed. However, the most parsimonious explanation of this overgeneral memory 
phenomenon in depression is lack of executive resources (Dalgleish et al., 2007).  
Executive resources are a broadly defined cluster of cognitive resources used in tasks 
ranging from inhibiting distractions to switching between task goals (Banich, 2009). All these 
executive-dependent tasks share in common the need to control attentional resources. As a 
construct, executive resources emerged out of Baddeley’s (1996) research on the 
subcomponents of working memory. He proposed that the central executive coordinates 
between the other components of working memory to meet task demands. More recently, 
neuroimaging data has demonstrated that executive functioning occurs primarily within the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, but involves additional brain regions as a cascade of activation 
spreads (Banich, 2009).  
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Research has shown that the consumption of executive resources by an executive-
dependent task can lead to depletion of the executive resource pool (Schmeichel, 2007). 
Inhibiting distracting text while watching a television show reduced performance on a later 
working memory task. In a replication of this study, participants inhibited the use of certain 
letters while writing a story. This effortful inhibition reduced subsequent performance on an 
executive measure involving the recall of digit spans. In yet another replication, researchers 
demonstrated how this depletion can affect executive-dependent tasks that are externally 
valid. Participants who took an initial working memory test showed a reduced ability to 
inhibit emotional responses to a film clip. Therefore, prior efforts at self-control or completion 
of tasks requiring attention deplete the pool of executive resources available to perform other, 
even quite different, tasks. 
The exact nature of this pool of resources is poorly specified by extant research and 
theory, but it appears to be related to attentional control. The resource depletion theory 
originated in social-cognitive research on self-control. In these early studies, researchers 
realized that any self-control effort would reduce the effectiveness of later attempts, even 
when they occur in a separate domain (Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1996). More recently, 
evidence has suggested that both executive functioning and self-control pull from the same 
pool of attentional resources (Kaplan & Berman, 2010). Not only does self-control reduce 
performance on executive tasks, performing an executive task also reduces participants’ 
ability for self-control (Scmeichel, 2007). For instance, participants who had used executive 
resources to ignore mathematical distractions had more difficulty inhibiting their emotional 
responses to a distressing film clip. Therefore, prior self-control efforts reduce later executive 
resources on working memory tasks, and vice versa. However, this shared resource is not 
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simply another term for intelligence. Depleting these resources via self-control tasks results in 
reduced performance on open-ended academic and intelligence tests, but has no effect on 
multiple choice intelligence tests and basic memorization tasks (Schmeichel, Vohs, & 
Baumeister, 2003).  
Simply stated, executive resources are used to direct attention to relevant tasks. 
Unfortunately, completing an executive-demanding task will deplete the pool of resources and 
hinder performance on later executive demanding tasks. This is important in terms of self-
relevant autobiographical recall because the hierarchical process of recalling autobiographical 
memories is an executive-demanding task (Haque & Conway, 2001). When recalling an 
autobiographical memory from scratch (generative retrieval), people begin with a vague 
memory trace of a lifetime period. In order to progress to a specific memory, people must use 
strategic inhibition to pick through irrelevant memories. A lack of executive resources may 
prevent people from successfully progressing down the autobiographical memory hierarchy to 
a specific memory (Haque & Conway, 2001;  Williams, 2006). In a timed memory probe 
methodology, Haque and Conway (2001) found that participants report general 
autobiographical memories if recall was interrupted early and specific autobiographical 
memories if given more time for recall. Furthermore, additional cognitive load during this 
probe methodology demonstrated that the hierarchical retrieval process is in fact interrupted 
by competing tasks. Therefore, the present study presumes that a lack of executive resources 
may prevent the successful progression of a memory search to specific autobiographical 
memories about the self (Dalgleish et al., 2007; Haque & Conway, 2001; Williams, 2006). 
 Overgeneral memory is the abnormal inability to recall a specific memory, something 
that occurred within a single day, rather than a long-lasting memory or category of memories. 
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Research on overgeneral memory began with clinicians who often reported that their clients 
who were depressed had difficulty elaborating on autobiographical memories (Williams & 
Broadbent, 1986). Consequently, overgeneral memory has been studied in relation to 
depression and independent of psychopathology. In response to clinical reports of overgeneral 
autobiographical memory, researchers developed a methodology to test for differences in the 
specificity of recall (Williams & Broadbent, 1986). The cueing methodology from this early 
research has become the standard for measuring specificity of autobiographical memory. 
 In order to explore clinical reports of overgeneral memories in patients who were 
depressed, Williams and Broadbent (1986) created the Autobiographical Memory Test 
(AMT). This early version consisted of 5 positive and 5 negative cue words.  Participants 
were individually shown each cue on a flashcard and told to recall a specific memory. In 
response to each cue, they were prompted to think of a specific event that occurred in a single 
day. Memories were rated by the experimenter as specific if they refer to a specific day (e.g., 
“eating the cake at my tenth birthday party”). They were rated as general if they refer to an 
event that lasted longer than a day (e.g., “summer camp”) or if they refer to a general class of 
events (e.g., “being happy”). Therefore, a participant’s performance on the AMT can be 
thought of as a ratio of general to specific memories. 
The AMT was first employed in a study involving a group of suicide attempters, a 
hospital control group, and a healthy, volunteer control group (Williams & Broadbent, 1986). 
Ratios derived from the AMT performance revealed that suicide attempters recalled more 
overgeneral memories than either control group. The tendency to recall overgeneral memory 
has become a well-replicated effect in the depression literature. 
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A lack of autobiographical specificity may seem like a trivial coincidence in people 
with depression. However, a great deal of research has demonstrated that this lack of 
specificity when recalling autobiographical memories is a reliable marker for depressive 
outcomes (Brittlebank et al., 1993; Gibbs & Rude, 2004; Mackinger et al., 2000; Peeters et 
al., 2002; van Minnen et al., 2005). Despite this abundance of research on overgeneral 
memory in depression, no clear causal link has been drawn between overgeneral memory and 
depressive outcomes. This suggests that a third variable may be responsible for both 
overgeneral memory and depressive outcomes. It is likely that a lack of executive resources 
both hinders patients with depression from controlling their emotions and behaviors, and 
hinders their ability to complete specific autobiographical memory recall. 
Individual differences in executive resources have recently been explored as a 
fundamental explanation for overgeneral memory in depression (Dalgleish et al., 2007; 
Wessel, Overwijk, Verwoerd, & Vrieze, 2008). Cognitive resource explanations have 
gradually become more common in depression research. For a number of years depression 
researchers have recognized a pattern of cognitive deficits in patients with depression 
(Castaneda et al., 2008). Patients diagnosed with major depression have exhibited deficits in 
the general domain of executive functioning, as well as numerous subcomponents of 
executive functioning (i.e., attention and working memory). Only recently has there been a 
systematic series of studies to determine the role of cognitive resources in the overgeneral 
memory phenomenon (Dalgleish et al., 2007). This executive resources explanation of 
overgeneral memory has also been corroborated by converging research from both cognitive 
psychology and neuropsychology (Banich, 2009; Neshat-Doost, Dalgleish, & Golden, 2008).   
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In order to show that individual differences in executive resources could account for 
much of the overgeneral memory effect, researchers tested for relationships between 
executive resources and the AMT (Dalgleish et al., 2007). In a set of correlational studies they 
administered a variety of widely accepted executive resource measures (verbal fluency, 
creative solutions, number generation, and fluid intelligence) in conjunction with the AMT. In 
every study, measures of executive resources correlated with AMT performance, even after 
depression had been partialed out. Some of these studies used depressive samples, while 
others used non-depressed volunteers. Therefore, regardless of depression and clinical 
diagnosis, individual differences in executive resources are inversely related to 
autobiographical memory specificity. Furthermore, these individual differences can account 
for much of the overgeneral memory effect found in depression. 
Not only do individual differences in executive resources predict autobiographical 
memory specificity, temporary fluctuations in available executive resources also cause 
variation in autobiographical memory specificity on the AMT (Dalgleish et al., 2007, Neshat-
Doost et al., 2008). The same researchers have shown that competing demands for executive 
resources reduce specificity in concurrent autobiographical memory recall and subsequent 
autobiographical memory recall (Dalgleish et al., 2007). In one study, they tested the effect of 
cognitive load (holding nine digits in memory) on the limited executive resources of a 
depressed sample. The results demonstrated that cognitive load caused poorer AMT 
performance (reduced specificity) for participants who had greater depressive symptoms. This 
result suggests that the limited executive resources in people with depression are strained by a 
cognitive load, resulting in overgeneral memory. A similar study also found that prior 
consumption of executive resources reduced specific autobiographical memory recall in a 
10 
 
subsequent test. Instead of using a cognitive load, like the previous study, these participants 
completed a Stroop Task (inhibiting interfering colors when reading color words) before 
completing the AMT (Neshat-Doost, Dalgleish, & Golden, 2008). Participants who completed 
the Stroop Task recalled less specific memories on the following AMT, compared to no-
Stroop controls. These results remained significant, even after controlling for differences in 
depression level. These findings demonstrate that executive resources act as a pool with 
limited resources, and can remain depleted for some time after a demanding task. 
 Therefore, it has been clearly established that people with a limited pool of executive 
resources have difficulty recalling specific autobiographical memories when prompted to do 
so (Dalgleish et al., 2007). This is presumed to be due to the inability to continue the 
hierarchical memory search leading from the initial general memory trace to the final specific 
memory (Haque & Conway, 2001). I propose that the amount of executive resources 
consumed is also contingent on where the memory search begins. 
Semantic and Episodic Storage 
When recalling memories of varying self-relevance, it is possible that the hierarchical 
search does not always begin in the same place in memory. In fact, there are theoretical 
reasons to believe the search may begin in distinctly separate memory stores depending on the 
self-relevance of the initial memory cue (Klein et al., 1996; Klein et al., 2009). 
An extensive line of research suggests that personal memories are stored in two 
distinct systems providing different levels of detail (Klein et al., 2009). This theory holds that 
people store semantic self-knowledge (broad, factual information) and episodic self-
knowledge (detailed, event memories) separately. Both experimental and  case studies have 
supported this theoretical distinction between the two systems of memory (Klein et al., 1997; 
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Klein et al., 1996). Using priming. researchers have shown that these two systems are 
functionally independent (Klein, Loftus, & Burton, 1989; Klein et al., 1997). This priming 
methodology involved two subsequent tasks: First, participants were instructed to either 
describe themselves with a trait adjective (semantic), to recall a specific instance of exhibiting 
a trait (episodic), or to define a trait word (control). Next, they were given one of the same 
three possible tasks. If semantic and episodic self-knowledge is stored in the same network, 
priming a semantic trait should lead to a speeded response for the following task regardless of 
whether it is semantic or episodic. On the other hand if semantic and episodic self-knowledge 
is stored in different networks, priming with the semantic instructions should only affect a 
subsequent semantic task.  Only the latter result has been found, demonstrating that semantic 
and episodic self-knowledge exist in separate networks (Klein et al., 1997). 
This distinction between the two memory stores for self-knowledge has also been 
demonstrated in a temporary amnesic college student and an autistic child (Klein, Chan, & 
Loftus, 1999; Klein et al., 1996). In one case, a college student received a concussion during 
her first semester of college. Researchers capitalized on her temporary amnesic state by 
testing her semantic  and episodic self-knowledge from her first semester (Klein et al., 1996). 
Consistent with their theory of separate memory stores for semantic and episodic  self-
knowledge, Klein and colleagues found that this student had severely disrupted episodic 
knowledge but seemingly intact semantic self-knowledge. However, it was possible that her 
semantic self-knowledge about college was inferred from pre-accident memories of high-
school. In another case study without such a potential confound, these researchers found 
similar results (Klein et al., 1999). R.J. was a young man who had been diagnosed with 
autism. Like other autistic children, R. J. had shown developmental delays and intellectual 
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impairment. He also demonstrated good semantic self-knowledge and very impaired episodic 
self-knowledge, relative to normal controls.  
These researchers have claimed that the semantic store of memory has evolved out of 
a basic need for fast, efficient evaluations of ourselves and the people around us (Klein et al., 
2009). They have also claimed that the episodic store of memory allows us to modify our 
evaluations based on conflicting details.  
According to this theory, episodic information from multiple events is abstracted into 
trait knowledge about the self-concept (Klein & Loftus, 1993; Klein et al., 1996). Episodic 
information from multiple similar experiences (i.e., attending parties and going out) is 
abstracted into semantic self-knowledge with a common theme (i.e., extroversion), while 
information from distinct experiences remains in a more detailed episodic form. In order to 
demonstrate that multiple similar experiences form semantic self-knowledge, Klein and 
colleagues (1996) examined the previously mentioned priming effect in relation to domains of 
high and low experience. They primed college freshmen by instructing them to describe 
themselves back home (high experience) or describe themselves in college (low experience). 
Participants who were given a high experience prime (describe home) showed equivalent 
reaction times for recalling specific episodic memories from home or college. Participants 
who were given a low experience prime (describe college) showed faster reaction times when 
recalling specific episodes from college. In other words, participants relied on semantic self-
knowledge to describe themselves in a high-experience context (home) but relied on episodic 
self-knowledge to describe themselves in a low-experience context (college). This is 
consistent with their theory that episodic memories are abstracted into semantic self-
knowledge once enough of them have accumulated.  
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Thus when people try to recall a memory that exemplifies their personality, they rely 
on the more general trait information about themselves stored as semantic self-knowledge. If 
they had a large number of experiences in that they acted in an extraverted manner, these 
experiences would have been abstracted into semantic self-knowledge that they were an 
extrovert. On the other hand, when people try to recall a memory that is inconsistent with 
their personality, they search for a more specific exemplar that would not fit their trait self-
knowledge. If they had very few experiences in that they acted in an introverted manner, these 
experiences would remain in the episodic store. Regardless of depression, a person who 
searches their memory for trait knowledge should spontaneously access their semantic store 
of trait self-knowledge. Therefore, participants who are instructed to recall specific memories 
to self-relevant cues are likely to begin their search in the more abstract, semantic store. Past 
research on these separate memory stores, as well as research on executive resources could 
potentially explain the relatively new findings on self-relevant autobiographical memory 
specificity. 
Self-Relevance and Specificity 
A small literature has shown that self-relevant autobiographical memories are often 
recalled as less specific than non-relevant autobiographical memories. In a few clinical 
studies, AMT cues relevant to depressive schemas resulted in less specific memories than 
non-relevant cues (Barnhofer et al., 2007; Spinhoven et al., 2007). Also, a similar pattern has 
been identified in social-cognitive research (Brunot & Sanitioso, 2004). This research 
suggests that people tend to recall general memories when searching for information 
consistent with their self-schemas, but tend to recall specific memories when searching for 
information inconsistent with their self-schemas.  
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Within the depression literature, dysfunctional attitudes are self-reported attitudes in 
depression that are believed to be part of an overarching depressive schema (Clark, Beck, & 
Alford, 1999). One example of an approval-based dysfunctional attitude is : “I should be able 
to please everybody”. These attitudes are believed to be part of the biased cognitive 
processing resulting from a depressive self-schema. In a study using only previously patients 
with depression, the participants’ endorsement of dysfunctional attitudes predicted the 
specificity of their responses to AMT cues related to those attitudes (Spinhoven et al., 2007). 
High endorsement of these dysfunctional attitudes was related to less specific memories in 
response to dysfunctional attitude cues. However, this particular study failed to show that the 
self-relevance of these dysfunctional attitudes was directly related to autobiographical 
specificity. When biographical variables and depression severity were entered into a 
hierarchical regression, the effect of self-relevance was no longer significant. Therefore, this 
study only provides partial support for the relationship between self-relevance and 
autobiographical memory specificity. 
In another study using previously depressed and never depressed participants, 
experimenters administered the Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (DAS: Weissman, 1979) 
followed by the AMT a week later (Barnhofer et al., 2007). Half of the AMT cues were given 
under a dual task condition, in which participants randomly pressed computer keys while 
verbally responding to the cues. As the executive resources theory would predict, participants 
generated fewer specific responses when their executive resources were taxed by the dual task 
demands. The results also revealed a three way interaction among depression, cognitive load, 
and dysfunctional attitudes (self-relevance) for dysfunctional attitude cues. Previously 
depressed participants who endorsed high levels of dysfunctional attitudes and who were 
15 
 
under cognitive load recalled less specific memories in response to dysfunctional attitude cues 
(self-relevant cues). Therefore, self-relevant cues led to the recall of overgeneral 
autobiographical memories, but only in previously depressed participants whose executive 
resources were already strained. 
In a another study by these researchers, previously depressed and never depressed 
participants provided self-descriptive words and returned a week later to take an AMT (Crane 
et al., 2007). The AMT consisted of a variety of personality cues (friendly, thorough, useless), 
some of that would inevitably overlap with participants’ self-descriptions. The results 
revealed an interaction in that cue self-relevance was negatively correlated with specificity of 
responses for previously depressed participants, while there was no significant correlation for 
never-depressed participants. Combined with the previous two studies, there appears to be 
converging correlational support of the effect of self-relevant cues on the specificity of 
autobiographical recall. In the first two studies, the authors suggested that dysfunctional 
attitude cues lead to overgeneral memory. However, the third study demonstrated that a 
similar effect can be found in previously depressed participants in response to their own self-
descriptions. Therefore, this effect appears to exist for any self-relevant cue given to a 
previously depressed sample. 
There is additional evidence that this effect of self-relevance on specificity exists 
outside of depression. The self-relevance of autobiographical memories has been 
experimentally manipulated in a non-clinical sample (Brunot & Sanitioso, 2004). Participants 
were led to believe that either introversion or extraversion was related to success and then 
asked to think about why this might be true. In what was ostensibly a second study, 
participants were asked to write down instances in that they behaved in an introverted or 
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extroverted manner. Participants were not instructed as to how specific their memories should 
be. Instead, their memories were later coded for specificity. Two blind raters coded each 
memory according to the same basic criteria used in the AMT. For introverted memories, 
introversion-success participants recalled more general than specific memories, relative to 
extraversion-success participants. For extraverted memories, extraversion-success participants 
recalled more general than specific memories, relative to introversion-success participants. 
Although extraverted memories mirrored the pattern for introverted memories, the interaction 
for extraverted memories did not reach significance. Therefore, this study only provides 
partial evidence that recalling self-relevant memories leads to reduced autobiographical 
specificity. Participants spontaneously recalled less specific self-relevant, introversion 
memories, again suggesting that beginning the memory search in the semantic self-knowledge 
store of general memories is more typical when searching for self-relevant memories. I 
propose that the tendency for self-relevant memories to be recalled as less specific is the 
product of the memory store they are recalled from and how many resources are used to shape 
them into a specific memory. 
Integrating Executive Resources and Self-Relevant Recall 
When recalling memories related to depressive self-schemas, people with depression 
are likely to begin with broad, semantic information, just like everyone else (Brunot & 
Sanitioso, 2004; Klein et al., 2009). Trimming these broad, semantic memories down to 
specific memories would likely require more executive resources for strategic inhibition than 
simply beginning with a relatively specific episodic memory. Not only do the low baseline 
levels of executive resources in participants with depression predict the specificity of their 
responses on a standard AMT, these individual differences also interact with the self-
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relevance of dysfunctional attitude AMT cues to produce less specific responses (Dalgeish et 
al., 2007; Barnhofer et al., 2007). Unlike participants with depression who recalled 
overgeneral memories in response to dysfunctional attitude cues, non-depressed participants 
showed no effect of cue self-relevance (Barnhofer et al., 2007). This would suggest that only 
previously-depressed participants lacked the necessary executive resources to inhibit the 
broad, semantic memories that are initially retrieved, while continuing to search for specific 
memory traces (Klein et al., 2009). However, no prior research has actually tested whether 
inhibiting the prepotent memory traces during self-relevant recall actually consumes greater 
amounts of executive resources. 
Despite the proposed mechanisms involving hierarchical retrieval that begin at a 
semantic level, an alternative pattern could also be true. It is possible that self-relevant 
memories are always easier to recall. Indirect evidence is found in research on the self-
reference effect (Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977), in which enhanced encoding is found for 
information that has been evaluated for its self-relevance. Participants have better memory for 
an item when they consider whether that item is self-relevant or non-relevant.  
Current Study  
The current study will test the hypothesis that recalling specific self-relevant memories 
consumes more executive resources than recalling specific non-relevant memories. Although 
participants may have an abundance of self-relevant information, it is presumably stored in a 
general semantic self-knowledge system (Klein et al., 2009). When external task demands 
require a specific self-relevant memory, participants should spontaneously access this 
semantic store (Klein et al., 1996). In order for this retrieval process to progress to the specific 
self-relevant memory, participants must employ controlled inhibition of the inappropriate 
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memories and continue the search (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). The volume of 
executive resources available during this inhibition will vary by individual (Dalgleish et al., 
2007). Furthermore, individual pools of executive resources will remain depleted following 
the effortful inhibition (Schmeichel, 2007). Therefore, I will assess the depletion of executive 
resources caused by recalling self-relevant memories by measuring remaining executive 
resources following recall. I hypothesize that participants recalling specific, self-relevant 
memories will have fewer remaining executive resources than participants recalling specific, 
non-relevant memories. This prediction is based on prior research in that recalling self-
relevant recall spontaneously leads to semantic memories that should theoretically require 
more executive resources to inhibit (Haque & Conway, 2001; Klein et al., 2009). My second 
hypothesis predicts an interaction between individual differences in executive resources and 
self-relevance, such that participants with low pre-existing executive resources will be most 
affected by the self-relevance of the memory cues. This prediction is consistent with research 
in which the effect of self-relevance emerged when executive resources were taxed (Crane et 
al., 2007).  
An alternative set of hypotheses is based on a general assumption that self-relevant 
memories are simply easier to recall. Although no direct evidence has shown that self-relevant 
autobiographical memories are more accessible, two lines of research provide indirect 
evidence for this notion. First, participants who encode items by considering its self-relevance 
remember it better than if they encoded it by considering the items’ meaning (Symons & 
Johnson, 1997). Second, participants are more likely to remember character traits from a story 
if those character traits are chronically accessible, or used to describe people on a regular 
basis (Higgins, King, & Mavin, 1982). Therefore, it is possible that self-relevant 
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autobiographical memories are encoded more effectively and chronically accessible. If this 
was the case, I would hypothesize a main effect of self-relevance such that participants in the 
non-relevant condition would exhibit lower remaining executive resources. Next, I would 
hypothesize an interaction such that participants who began with low levels of executive 
resources would have especially low levels of remaining executive resources after recalling 
non-relevant autobiographical memories.  
Methodology 
Participants 
  Ninety-one psychology students at the University of Arkansas participated in the 
experiment as partial fulfillment of a course requirement. The experiment lasted 
approximately half an hour, for which participants received .5 experimental credits toward 
their General Psychology class requirement. An a priori power analysis indicated that 77 
participants would be needed to identify a medium-sized effect (f
2
 < .15) in a fixed-factor 
hierarchical linear regression, using α = .05 and β = .2. This sample was more than adequate 
for detecting a medium effect size considering that two related studies found significant 
results with relatively small samples. One study, using an executive task to deplete resources 
and therefore alter AMT performance, found significant pair-wise effects with a small sample, 
F (2, 47) = 7.29, p < .01, η2 = .24 (Neshat-Doost et al., 2008). Using a very small sample, the 
second study found a correlation between the autobiographical specificity and the same 
number generation measure proposed in the current study, r (19) = -.39, p < .05 (Dalgleish et 
al., 2007). 
Design 
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The experiment employed a two-factor design with self-relevance of memory cue 
(relevant and non-relevant) and pre-existing executive resources (continuous factor) as 
between-subjects variables. For analyses, self-relevance was dummy coded (0 = non-relevant, 
1 = relevant). Self-relevance, individual differences in executive resources, and their 
interaction term were entered into a hierarchical linear regression on remaining executive 
resources. This design allowed me to test the hypothesized interaction in which the effect of 
self-relevance on remaining executive resources is more pronounced in participants with low 
pre-existing executive resources.  
Materials 
Thurstone Verbal Fluency Test. In order to obtain a baseline measure of executive 
resources, a modified version of the verbal fluency test was used (Lezak, 1995).  Participants 
were instructed to list as many words beginning with the letter s as possible in one minute. 
Participants were warned that repetitions, proper nouns (e.g., Switzerland), and words of the 
same origin (e.g., swim, swimming) would not count. The total number of acceptable words 
was used as a final score. Although the original Thurstone Verbal Fluency Test included two 
tests lasting a total of nine minutes, this abbreviated one-minute version has been successfully 
used in autobiographical memory research (Dalgleish et al., 2007). 
Memory Cueing Methodology. Slightly different cueing methodologies were 
provided for each condition. Participants in the self-relevant condition were instructed to write 
three adjectives that they felt described who they are. Participants in the non-relevant 
condition were instructed to write three adjectives that they felt were poor descriptions of who 
they are. After choosing three adjectives, participants in both conditions were instructed to 
recall a specific memory for each adjective. The experimenter checked the specificity of each 
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memory, reminding the participant what the criteria was for a specific memory if the recalled 
memory did not meet criteria (a single event occurring within a day). Once participants 
reached criteria for a specific memory, they proceed to the next adjective. The experimenter 
was kept blind to the participant’s condition. Data collected from this task were only used for 
the manipulation check. 
  Number Generation Task. In order to obtain a measure of remaining executive 
resources, a number generation task followed the autobiographical recall. This task included 
fifteen items requiring participants to generate numbers that satisfied two or more constrains 
(e.g., “Could you please give me a sequence of any five numbers within the range one 
hundred up to five hundred?”). These items required executive functioning in order to 
generate a sequence of the correct length while remaining within the bounds. As the required 
sequence become longer, failures to satisfy the constraints increase. Also, when the 
boundaries are odd numbers, failures to satisfy the constraints also increase. Consistent with 
past research, these items were presented to participants verbally (Dalgleish et al., 2007; 
Scott, Barnard, & May, 2001). Three types of errors were entered by a single coder: numbers 
not in sequence, an incorrect number of digits, and numbers that fall outside the upper or 
lower bounds. A total error score was computed by summing all three types of errors. This 
error score was the dependent variable of interest (Dalgleish et al., 2007). 
Predictions 
 The total error scores from the number generation task provided a measure of 
remaining executive resources. A relatively large number of total errors would indicate low 
remaining executive resources, while a relatively small number of total errors would indicate 
high remaining executive resources. Using a hierarchical linear regression, pre-existing 
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executive resources, self-relevance, and their interaction term were regressed upon the total 
error score. All three terms were predicted to account for significant portions of variance (see 
Figure 1). In other words, low levels of pre-existing resources should have led to easy 
depletion of the executive resource pool. Similarly, the self-relevant condition, which requires 
inhibition of the prepotent semantic memory trace in order to meet task demands, should have 
depleted the executive pool to a greater degree. Furthermore, participants who had low pre-
existing levels of executive resources should have been depleted more by the difficult self-
relevant condition.   
Results 
 After removing the data of 7 participants who did not complete the packets, data from 
84 participants were included in the analyses. To assure that participants in both conditions 
performed equally well on the autobiographical recall task I did a manipulation check of their 
recall responses. Participants generally recalled specific autobiographical memories in the 
first attempt for each personality trait listed. The average number of failures to retrieve a 
specific memory was low, M = .52, SD = .82. Also, the number of mistakes on the 
autobiographical recall task did not differ by condition, F (1, 82) = .59, ns. Therefore, 
participants in both conditions were equally capable of recalling specific autobiographical 
memories. 
 Primary Analyses. The primary analysis was a hierarchical linear regression. In the 
first step, individual differences in executive resources (centered word generation scores) and 
experimental condition (dummy coded experimental condition) were regressed on remaining 
executive resources. In the second step, the interaction between individual differences and 
experimental condition was added to the model. Remaining executive resources were 
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computed by summing errors on the number generation task and reversing the sign of this 
error score. In other words, the more errors participants made on this executive dependent 
task the fewer executive resources they are presumed to have in their pool (refer to Table 1).  
The regression model from the first step accounted for a significant amount of 
variance in remaining executive resources, F (2, 81) = 4.65, p < .02, adjusted R
2
 = .08. As 
expected, participants with higher individual levels of executive resources performed 
marginally better on the final executive measure, β = 1.36, p < .10, sr2 = .03. Contrary to 
predictions, participants in the self-relevant condition (M = -2.20, SD = 2.23) performed 
significantly better on the final executive measure than participants in the non-relevant recall 
condition (M = -3.79, SD = 3.41), β = 1.54, p < .02, sr2 = .07. 
The regression model from the second step (including the interaction) accounted for 
significantly more variance than the first step, F (3, 80) = 17.20, p < .01, adjusted R
2
 = .26. 
Similar to the previous step, pre-existing executive resources also accounted for a significant 
portion of unique variance, β = .21, p < .01, sr2 = .07. The experimental condition also 
accounted for a significant portion of variance, β = 1.52, p < .01, sr2 = .07. Most notably, the 
interaction of individual differences of executive resources and experimental condition 
accounted for a significant portion of variance, β = -.63, p < .01, sr2 = .16.  
This interaction was further examined by regressing pre-existing executive resources 
on remaining executive resources separately for each experimental condition. For participants 
recalling self-relevant memories, there was no relationship between pre-existing executive 
resources and remaining executive resources, β = -1.2, ns. For participants recalling non-
relevant memories, there was a positive relationship between pre-existing executive resources 
and remaining executive resources, β = .52, p < .01, adjusted R2 = .27. Therefore, participants 
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with low pre-existing levels of executive resources used more resources to recall non-relevant 
autobiographical memories than to recall self-relevant autobiographical memories (refer to 
Figure 1).  
Secondary Analyses. One possible confound that could not be ruled out by the 
current methodology was the negativity of the memories being recalled. It was possible that 
any effects in the primary analysis could be at least partially due to the negativity of the 
autobiographical memories themselves. It was possible that if one condition may have 
recalled more negative memoires. Additionally, negative memories could require more 
executive resources due to their limited accessibility (Bower & Gilligan, 1979; Holmes, 
1970). Researchers have known for decades that participants are more likely to recall positive 
memories. Therefore, if the experimental manipulation of self-relevance is confounded by 
negativity, one condition may have the advantage of recalling readily accessible positive 
memories while the other condition must recall less accessible negative memories. Negativity 
of the autobiographical memories was not addressed in the a priori predictions but was worth 
further exploration. To address this possible confound each of the three memories were coded 
as Positive (1), Neutral (2), or Negative (3). Their negativity scores were summed to create an 
overall negativity composite score for participants’ autobiographical recall. Participants 
typically recalled a neutral mix of memories (M = 6.04, SD = 1.62). Not surprisingly, 
participants in the self-relevant condition (M = 5.39, SD = 1.32) recalled significantly less 
negative memories than the non-relevant condition (M = 6.68, SD = 1.65), F (1, 80) = 15.34, p 
< 01, partial η2 = .16. However, negativity was not related to the final measure of remaining 
executive resources, p > .05, and therefore it cannot explain the pattern of results obtained. 
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Although negativity had been ruled out as a confound, a secondary hierarchical linear 
regression was conducted to included negativity and the interactions involving negativity. 
This regression included three steps: The first step was similar to the first step in the primary 
analyses, except it also included negativity as a predictor. The second step was also similar to 
the second step in the primary analyses, except it included an interaction term of negativity 
and condition as well as an interaction term of negativity and individual differences in 
executive resources (two-way interactions). The third step included a three-way interaction 
term of negativity, self-relevance condition, and pre-existing executive resources into the 
model (refer to Table 2).  
The regression model from the first step accounted for a significant amount of 
variance in residual executive resources, F (3, 78) = 3.30, p < .03, adjusted R
2
 = .08. 
Participants with higher individual levels of executive resources performed marginally better 
on the final executive measure, β = .15, p < .09, sr2 = .03. Participants in the self-relevant 
condition performed significantly better on the final executive measure, β = 1.84, p < .02, sr2 
= .08. Consistent with the lack of correlation mentioned above, negativity of memories was 
unrelated to performance on the final executive measure, β = .22, ns. 
The regression model from the second step (including the two-way interactions) 
accounted for significantly more variance than the first step, F (6, 75) = 7.07, p < .01, 
adjusted R
2
 = .25. Within this model, pre-existing executive resources also accounted for a 
significant portion of unique variance, β = .21, p < .02, sr2 = .06. Self-relevance condition 
accounted for a significant portion of unique variance, β = 1.65, p < .02, sr2 = .06. Again, 
negativity of memories remained unrelated to performance on the remaining executive 
measure, β = .12, ns. As in the primary analyses, the interaction between individual 
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differences of executive resources and self-relevance condition accounted for a significant 
portion of unique variance, β = -.74, p < .01, sr2 = .16. Also, the interaction between 
negativity of memories and self-relevance condition accounted for a marginally significant 
portion of unique variance, β = -.79, p < .06, sr2 = .03. Finally, the interaction between 
negativity and individual differences in executive resources did not account for a significant 
portion of variance, β = -.04, p = ns.  
The regression model from the third step (including a three-way interaction) did not 
account for significantly more variance in residual executive resources than the model from 
the second step and will not be discussed any further, F (1, 74) = .18, ns. It is worth noting 
that the regression model (second step) from the secondary analyses only accounted for 
marginally more variance than the regression model from the primary analyses, F (6, 75) = 
1.86,  p < .14, adjusted R
2
 = .25. 
Interestingly, the relationship between pre-existing executive resources and remaining 
executive resources, as well as the relationship between self-relevance and remaining 
executive resources, were similar to those found in the primary analyses. However, the 
interaction between pre-existing executive resources and self-relevance was opposite in 
direction to that found in the primary analyses (see Figure 2). Additionally, the secondary 
analyses revealed a marginally significant interaction between negativity and self-relevance 
(refer to Figure 3). This interaction was further explored by performing separate regressions 
of negativity for each experimental condition. For participants recalling self-relevant 
memories, there was no effect of memory negativity on performance on the final executive 
measure, β = .47, ns. Similarly, participants recalling non-relevant memories did not evidence 
a relationship between negativity and remaining executive resources, β = .38, ns. The results 
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of the secondary analyses are interesting because they essentially reverse the interaction 
between self-relevance and pre-existing executive resources. In the primary analyses, self-
relevant recall led to more remaining executive resources. However, this simple effect only 
occurred in participants with low pre-existing executive resources. In the secondary analyses, 
self-relevant recall led to more remaining executive resources. In this case, the simple effect 
only occurred in participants with high pre-existing executive resources. These findings are 
somewhat perplexing and will be discussed below in greater detail. 
Conclusion 
In the present study I hypothesized that low levels of pre-existing resources should 
have led to easy depletion of the executive resource pool. Also, the self-relevant condition, 
which was believed to require inhibition of the prepotent semantic memory trace, should have 
depleted the executive pool to a greater degree. Finally, participants who had low pre-existing 
levels of executive resources should have been depleted more by the difficult self-relevant 
condition.  As predicted, participants who had high pre-existing levels of executive resources 
also had relatively high levels of remaining executive resources following the recall task. This 
of course was expected since participants with large pools of executive resources would be 
less affected by any depleting task. Contrary to predictions, participants instructed to recall 
self-relevant memories had more remaining executive resources than participants instructed to 
recall non-relevant memories. Therefore, self-relevant memories were easier to recall. Finally, 
self-relevance and pre-existing executive resources interacted such that participants who 
began with low pre-existing executive resources had fewer remaining executive resources 
after recalling memories of low self-relevance. Participants who began with high pre-existing 
executive resources were not differentially affected by the self-relevance manipulation. There 
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appeared to be a ceiling effect for remaining executive resources. This was confirmed by a 
positive skew in errors made on the remaining executive resource measure such that most 
participants made very few errors, D (85) = .21, p < .01. 
When secondary analyses were run to include the possible confounding effects of the 
negativity of memories recalled, the main effect of self-relevance, a marginal effect of pre-
existing executive resources, and a two-way interaction between self-relevance and pre-
existing executive resources all remained. However, the interaction between pre-existing 
executive resources and the self-relevance of recall was reversed. When negativity of the 
memories was statistically controlled for in the secondary analyses, participants who began 
with high pre-existing executive resources had more remaining executive resources after 
recalling high self-relevance memories. Participants who began with low pre-existing 
executive resources were not differentially affected by the self-relevance manipulations. 
Although it is not entirely clear why statistically controlling for negativity altered the pattern 
of the interaction between self-relevance and pre-existing executive resources, it is most likely 
due to the fact that the non-relevant condition recalled significantly more negative memories, 
F (1, 82) = 16.53, MSE = 2.25, p <.01. However, negativity was unrelated to remaining 
executive resources, which makes any explanation based on negativity of the recalled 
memories insufficient. The difference between the high self-relevance and the low self-
relevance conditions for participants with low pre-existing executive resources disappeared 
once negativity was statistically controlled for (refer to Figure 1 and Figure 2). This may have 
been due to the fact that the low self-relevance condition recalled more negative memories, 
which were potentially more difficult. Therefore, I might argue that participants with low pre-
existing executive resources performed worse due to the difficulty of negative memories, not 
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due to the difficulty of low self-relevance. Unfortunately, this logic does not help to explain 
the pattern of results for participants with high pre-existing executive resources. I would have 
expected that participants with high pre-existing executive resources would have relatively 
high remaining executive resources regardless of whether they recalled high self-relevance or 
low self-relevance memories. In fact, this is what the primary analysis showed (refer to Figure 
1). However, self-relevant memories were less negative and therefore may be relatively 
easier. This means that statistically controlling for difficulty should have removed the relative 
ease of recalling highly self-relevant memories. This increased difficulty of recalling self-
relevant memories should have been evidenced by decreased remaining executive resources in 
the self-relevant condition. However, the results showed that participants with high pre-
existing executive resources, who recalled highly self-relevant memories, actually saw an 
increase in remaining executive resources once difficulty was statistically controlled for (refer 
to Figure 2). Therefore, an interpretable pattern has not emerged from the secondary analyses, 
but the negativity of recalled memories will provide an interesting avenue for future research  
There are theoretical reasons to believe that recalling self-relevant memories to meet 
specificity criteria would require more executive resources than recalling non-relevant 
memories to the meet the same specificity criteria (Dalgleish et al., 2007; Haque & Conway, 
2001; Klein et al., 1996). However, the present results do not support this hypothesized 
pattern. Participants who recalled self-relevant memories made relatively few errors on the 
final executive resource task, indicating that the self-relevant recall had not depleted their 
pool of executive resources. Participants who recall non-relevant memories made a greater 
number of errors on the final executive resource task, indicating that the non-relevant recall 
had depleted their pool of executive resources. However, this pattern only existed in 
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participants who had low levels of pre-existing executive resources. Participants who began 
the experiment with high levels of executive resources appeared to be unaffected by either 
recall condition. This relative ease with that participants with high executive resources 
completed the remaining executive resource task was evidenced by a significant skew; that is, 
they made very few errors. 
Although these findings were counter to my original hypotheses, they raise some very 
intriguing questions. One methodological explanation for the main effect of self-relevance is 
that executive resources used to recall autobiographical memory may have been 
unintentionally consumed by the somewhat confusing directions in the non-relevant 
condition. In order to generate non-relevant cues, the instructions blatantly asked participants 
to provide three trait adjectives that did not describe them. Immediately after they wrote down 
these three trait adjectives, they were asked to recall specific instances in which they exhibited 
these adjectives. This task would be difficult and counterintuitive for reasons other than the 
hypothesized autobiographical recall process. In contrast, participants in the self-relevant 
condition were instructed to generate three trait words that did describe themselves and then 
to generate specific instances in which they exhibited those traits. This task did not appear to 
confuse the participants and therefore would be easier for reasons other than the hierarchical 
search process. In fact, a number of participants voiced their confusion about the non-relevant 
condition. Therefore, the non-relevant condition may have been confounded by an increased 
difficulty of interpreting the counterintuitive instructions.  
Addressing this methodological issue brings up questions about the operationalization 
of self-relevant memories. Are non-relevant autobiographical memories simply neutral 
memories that are entirely independent of a person’s self-concept or are they memories that 
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define the boundaries of the self-concept by establishing a rare exception in which a person’s 
behavior did not coincide with their more characteristic behavioral patterns? Empirical 
evidence suggests that memories that characterize the self are stored and retrieved differently 
than memories that do not (Klein et al., 1996). Additionally, new memories are assimilated 
into our semantic self-knowledge if they are consistent with past behavior (Klein et al., 2009). 
Future research should therefore use the term “less relevant” rather than “non-relevant” to 
avoid confusion. I am primarily interested in differences in recall between memories that are 
characteristic of the self and memories that are not characteristic but may none the less be 
self-relevant because they define the boundaries of the self. 
In order to clarify these results, future research must employ a cueing methodology 
that allows both conditions to be free of unnecessary cognitive dissonance. One way to 
approach this problem is to use trait adjectives that are self-relevant (or not) while still 
maintaining a degree of ambiguity. For instance, Brunot and Sanitioso (2004) used introverted 
and extroverted as trait adjectives to cue autobiographical memory recall. Introversion and 
extroversion are ambiguous in that they are a bipolar continuum. Everyone is introverted to 
some degree and extraverted to some degree. Unlike that of other researchers, my 
methodology required the use of idiosyncratic trait adjectives. However, I could generate a list 
of more ambiguous trait adjectives that participants could rate for self-relevance. Presumably 
the degree of self-relevance for each adjective would remain fairly stable over time, during 
which time participants’ memory for their self-reported ratings would fade. The experimenter 
could bring participants back into the lab after a couple of weeks and ask them to recall 
memories for either the three most self-relevant or the three least self-relevant traits from their 
earlier self-reported rankings. By separating the generation of trait adjective cues and the 
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recall of autobiographical memories for the three most (or least) relevant cues, the cues could 
remain somewhat ambiguous and would not arouse dissonance.  
A second, more literal interpretation of the main effect of self-relevance is that 
specific, self-relevant memories are easier to recall than specific, non-relevant memories. This 
explanation is generally consistent with research on the self-reference effect and chronic 
construct accessibility (Higgins et al., 1982; Rogers et al., 1977). There is substantial 
experimental evidence that information is encoded much more effectively when their self-
relevance is considered (Symons & Johnson, 1997).The self-reference effect is traditionally 
demonstrated by having participants either make semantic judgments about a list of words (is 
the target word a synonym to some other word) or make self-reference judgments about the 
same list of words (does the word describe you). Using this methodology Rogers and 
colleagues (1977) concluded that the self-concept has special encoding properties. More 
recently, this effect has been explained by a dual process theory of elaboration and 
organization (Klein & Loftus, 1997). Elaboration is the encoding process that occurs when a 
person encounters a single item and thinks of the various schemas to which it is related. For 
instance, when an extrovert sees the word outgoing she may think of her self-concept as an 
extrovert. Organization is the encoding process that occurs when a person sees multiple 
related items and interprets them as related information. In this case, an extrovert who is 
thinking about her self-concept may see a group of words that are all related to her. In both 
elaboration and organization the information is encoded more effectively. The primary 
problem with drawing parallels between the self-reference effect and the present set of results 
is that the self-reference effect occurs regardless of how self-relevant an item is. In other 
words, if you evaluate the self-relevance of an event only to determine that it is irrelevant to 
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your self-concept your memory will still be enhanced. However, self-relevance in the present 
study may still be confounded by self-referent encoding. It is possible that memories that are 
currently viewed as self-relevant were initially encoded by consciously considering whether 
they were relevant (self-reference effect). Conversely, memories that are currently viewed as 
non-relevant were may be less likely to be encoded in reference to the self. It is easy to 
imagine that most non-relevant memories would be encoded in a more typical, neutral 
fashion. Therefore, memories recalled in the high self-relevant condition may have 
disproportionately benefitted from superior self-referent encoding while memories recalled in 
the low self-relevant condition may have not benefitted from self-referent encoding. Although 
this is certainly a possibility, the present study provided no evidence to suggest that one 
condition benefitted from self-referent encoding than another condition. 
The chronic accessibility of self-relevant constructs could also help explain why self-
relevant memories may be more accessible (Higgins et al., 1982). Constructs have been used 
to explain the manner in which people perceive one another. More specifically, constructs that 
people use regularly and are very familiar with are likely to affect their perception of other 
people (Bargh, Lombardi, & Higgins, 1988; Higgins et al., 1982). Furthermore, peoples’ 
memory of perceptions that are related to their chronically accessible constructs are more 
resistant to decay than memory of perceptions that are not related to chronically accessible 
constructs. In two studies Higgins and colleagues (1982) defined chronically accessible 
constructs based on the primacy and frequency at which character traits regarding these 
constructs were used to describe people. So participants who often described their 
acquaintances as lazy were said to have a chronically accessible construct of laziness. In these 
studies, participants read an essay about characters whose behavior exemplified a number of 
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traits. Some of these traits overlapped with the chronically accessible constructs while others 
did not. Then participants were instructed to reconstruct the essay word for word. Results 
indicated that participants tended to omit the character traits that were not chronically 
accessible. These results generally suggest that people tend to remember people in a manner 
that is consistent with their pre-existing, chronically accessible constructs. The same may be 
true with regards to memories of peoples’ own behavior. It is likely that participants in the 
present study remembered their self-relevant memories in a manner that was consistent with 
their own self-construct. This may have increased the accessibility self-relevant memories, 
while decreasing the accessibility of non-relevant memories. Chronically accessible self-
constructs are certainly the best explanation for higher levels of remaining executive 
resources in the self-relevant recall condition.   
However, there is a theoretical difference between the initial encoding of an 
autobiographical memory and the later recall of that memory. The current methodology has 
no means to distinguish between difficulty of recall due to the quality of encoding 
(elaboration and organization) and the difficulty of recall due to the hierarchical retrieval 
process (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Klein & Loftus, 1988). Studies that are concerned 
with the autobiographical retrieval process tend to hold encoding constant (Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Dalgleish et al., 2007; Williams & Broadbent, 1986). On the other 
hand, studies that are concerned with the encoding of memory tend to hold the retrieval 
process constant (Klein & Loftus, 1988). The current study did not hold encoding nor 
retrieval constant. Unfortunately, the dependent variable in this experiment only measured the 
depletion of executive resources following the entire experiment. Therefore, the higher levels 
of remaining executive resources in the self-relevant condition could be evidence of superior 
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encoding of self-relevant memories or evidence that the hierarchical retrieval process is not 
actually more difficult for self-relevant recall (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Klein & 
Loftus, 1997). 
 In order to separate the possible effects of encoding from the effects of hierarchical 
retrieval of autobiographical memories a new methodology is necessary. The encoding of 
autobiographical memories must be controlled in a laboratory setting. In order to ensure that 
participants encode their autobiographical memories in a similar fashion, another follow-up 
study should include a phase in which participants encode an experience as either self-
relevant or non-relevant while trying to maintain a comparable level of elaboration and 
organization. Participants would then complete a puzzle task in the laboratory followed by a 
memory test. In the self-relevant condition, participants would be told that performance on the 
laboratory task will effectively allow the researchers to assess his or her personality and that 
they will receive the results when they return to the follow-up session. In the non-relevant 
condition, participants will be told that they will be tested on the puzzle task when they return 
to the follow-up session. Next, participants would complete a memory measure about the 
puzzle task to help address concerns about differences in encoding. Although I could not be 
entirely sure that participants in both conditions encoded the memory equally effectively, I 
can use the performance on this initial memory measure to help statistically control for 
differences. 
 In a second, follow-up session participants would return to the lab and complete a pre-
existing executive resource measure, an autobiographical recall task, and a final measure of 
remaining executive resources. This portion would closely mimic the present study with the 
exception of the autobiographical recall task. The autobiographical recall task would ask 
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participants to verbally recall their experience on the puzzle task in as much detail as possible. 
Like the present experiment, I would analyze remaining executive resources in order to 
determine whether self-relevant or non-relevant autobiographical memories require more 
executive resources to recall in a specific manner. 
 By addressing the methodological concerns mentioned above I would be able to more 
directly test my hypothesis and potentially link pre-existing theories of autobiographical 
memory storage and search. If I could demonstrate that recalling self-relevant memories in 
specific detail requires more executive resources than recalling non-relevant memories in 
specific detail (assuming memory encoding is held constant), I would be able to elaborate on 
hierarchical retrieval models of autobiographical memory (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) 
and on executive resource consumption in autobiographical recall (Dalgleish et al., 2007; 
Williams, 2006). With respect to Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s (2000) model my 
hypothesized results would demonstrate that autobiographical memory construction does not 
always begin at a general level. If participants recalling non-relevant memories find the 
remaining executive resource task easier, it would suggest that these participants began their 
memory search with a more specific memory trace. With respect to Dalgleish’s (2007) theory 
of executive resources and overgeneral memory, my hypothesized results would suggest that 
the self-relevance of autobiographical memories determines how difficult recall is and 
therefore may result in more overgeneral memory. Furthermore, this pattern of data would 
suggest that the distinction between episodic and semantic memory systems is not as simple 
as previously thought (Klein et al., 1989). Despite being separate systems my hypothesized 
data would provide initial evidence that specific episodic memories may be reached by 
starting with semantic memory traces. This of course would be a preliminary explanation due 
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to the fact that my proposed studies have no means to test exactly in which memory store a 
hierarchical memory search begins. 
Building a clearer understanding of the role of executive resources in self-relevant 
recall is a critical step in the basic cognitive science of autobiographical memory, as well as in 
clinical research that has found autobiographical specificity to be a robust predictor of 
negative mental health outcomes (Brittlebank et al., 1993; Gibbs & Rude, 2004; Mackinger et 
al., 2000; Peeters et al., 2002; van Minnen et al., 2005). In both basic cognitive and clinical 
literature, self-relevant autobiographical memories are more likely to be recalled in a general 
form. However, there are some discrepancies in how these two fields view this pattern. Social 
psychologists have suggested that the tendency to recall self-relevant memories as general 
may be caused by self-enhancement motives (Brunot & Sanitioso, 2004). Alternately, 
depression researchers have suggested that the tendency to recall self-relevant memories as 
general may be due to depressive schemas that cause depressive content to be more difficult 
to recall (Barnhofer et al., 2007). Understanding the underlying process by which executive 
resources are allocated to recall self-relevant autobiographical memories would be very 
beneficial to both fields, potentially giving them a common framework to share theory and 
data.   
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Figure 1  
Two-way interaction between baseline resources and self-relevance condition. 
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Notes: Baseline executive resources were regressed as a continuous predictor variable.  
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Figure 2  
Two-way interaction between baseline resources and self-relevance condition after 
statistically controlling for negativity. 
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Notes: Baseline executive resources were regressed as a continuous predictor variable.  
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Figure 3  
Marginal two-way interaction between the negativity of recalled memories and self-relevance 
condition after statistically controlling for negativity. 
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Notes: Negativity of recalled memories was regressed as a continuous predictor variable.  
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Table 1 
Hiearchical Linear Regression with Baseline Executive Resources, Self-Relevance Condition, 
and Baseline by Self-Relevance Interaction. 
 β SE t ΔR2 F 
Step 1 
            Baseline Resources 
            Self-Relevance 
             
            
 
 
.14 
1.54 
 
 
.08 
.63 
 
 
1.67   
2.47* 
 
.095 
 
4.29* 
Step 2 
            Baseline Resources 
            Self-Relevance  
            Baseline X Self-Relevance 
            
 
 
.21 
1.52 
.63 
 
 
.08 
.57 
.15 
 
 
2.73** 
2.66** 
-4.15** 
 
1.56 
 
9.03*** 
 
     
Note: Baseline Executive Resources and Self-Relevance were centered. 
*  p<.05 
**  p<.01 
***  p<.001 
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Table 2 
Hiearchical Linear Regression with Baseline Executive Resources, Self-Relevance Condition, 
Memory Negativity, Two-Way Interactions, and a Three-Way Interaction. 
  β SE t ΔR2 F 
Step 1     .11 3.23* 
 Baseline Resources .15 .08 1.74   
 Self-Relevance 1.82 .70 2.61*   
 Negativity .23 .22 1.02   
       
Step 2     .20 5.61*** 
 Baseline Resources .21 .08 2.62*   
 Self-Relevance 1.63 .63 2.60*   
 Negativity .12 .20 .73   
 Baseline X Self-Relevance -.74 .18 -4.20***   
 Negativity X Baseline -.04 .05 -.70   
 Negativity X Self-Relevance -.84 -.40 -2.09*   
       
Step 3     .002 4.79*** 
 Baseline Resources .19 .09 2.07   
 Self-Relevance 1.62 .64 2.52   
 Negativity .12 .20 .60   
 Baseline X Self-Relevance -.75 .18 -4.17*   
 Negativity X Baseline -.04 .05 -.75   
 Negativity X Self-Relevance -.80 .41 -1.95   
 Negativity X Self Relevance    -.04 .10 -.43   
                   X Baseline      
Note: Baseline Executive Resources and Self-Relevance were centered. 
*  p<.05 
**  p<.01 
***  p<.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
